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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS POST-MAYO
AND MYRIAD
Jacob S. Sherkow*
The Supreme Court has recently expressed increased interest in patent eligibility, or patentable subject matter, the doctrine that limits the types of inventions eligible for patenting. Its two decisions, Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,1 in 2012, and Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,2 in 2013, represented the first broad restrictions on patentable subject matter in over thirty years. 3 And later this term,
the Court will decide yet another patent eligibility case: Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank International.4 While the effects of the Mayo and Myriad decisions on
patent law have been widely discussed, they have recently played a fascinating-and less explored-role in another area of law: preliminary injunctions. In
several recent patent cases, the contours of Mayo and Myriad have driven district courts to deny preliminary injunctions on patent eligibility grounds. This
has subtly altered the texture of the preliminary injunction standard in patent
infringement disputes, causing district courts to place greater emphasis on difficult, scientifically complex questions of patent eligibility at nascent stages of
litigation. While time-and appeals-will tell whether this change remains viable, this shift in the preliminary injunction standard provides a fascinating,
practical case study as to one law: the law of unintended consequences.
MAYO AND MYRIAD

In Mayo, the asserted patents claimed a method for adjusting the dosage of
thiopurine drugs-useful in treating gastrointestinal disease but sometimes toxic-based on specific concentrations of the drugs' metabolites in patients'

* Fellow, Stanford Law School, Center for Law and the Biosciences. Thanks to my
excellent editors at the Stanford Law Review for their constructive comments.
1. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
3. In 2010, the Court decided another patentable subject matter case-Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)-although the immediate effect of that decision has been unclear. See generally Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REv. 1315 (2011)
(discussing the uncertain future effect of Bilski). But prior to Bilski, the Supreme Court had
not restricted patentable subject matter since Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), thirtytwo years earlier.
4. 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013) (No. 13-298).
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blood.5 The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether this insight-the specific correlation uncovered by researchers distinguishing therapeutic and toxic doses- "preempt[ed] all uses of the naturally occurring correlations" and therefore ran afoul of the Court's earlier patent eligibility
jurisprudence.6 While the Court could have decided the case narrowly, it invalidated the patents' claims on rather broad and cryptic terms: the claims failed to
contain an "inventive concept"; they tread on 'laws of nature"; and they were
merely "well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in
by researchers in the field." 9
In Myriad, the asserted patents claimed two forms of DNA: human genes
isolated, in toto, from the genome, called genomic DNA; and a selection of the
functional, or protein-coding, part of those genes, called cDNA. 10 The question
presented to the Supreme Court in Myriad was deceptively simple: "Are human
genes patentable?" 1 1 Again, the Court could have disposed of the case on narrow, or at least coterminous, grounds. But the Court invalidated the patents'
claims to genomic DNA on the theory that they were primarily "informational,"
while it upheld the patents' claims to cDNA as primarily "chemical." 12
In many ways, these decisions have been difficult to interpret. First, the
Court's failure to address Mayo in its Myriad decision highlights the "logical
discontinuity" between the two decisions 13: is a new chemical created using
"well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously engaged in by researchers in the field" nonetheless patent eligible? Second, the decisions seem
to join two previously distinct areas of patent ineligibility: "natural laws" and
"products" on the one hand and "abstract ideas" on the other.14 Third, patent
eligibility's long-standing allowance of patents on "natural products" as long as
they are "isolated and purified" from their surrounding environments now is in
doubt. 15 Being forced to draw the difficult line between molecules that are pri-

5. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623 col. 8 11. 37-40 (filed Apr. 8, 1999).
6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289 (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL
992001.
7. Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294 (internal quotation marks omitted).
8. Id. at 1298.
9. Id. at 1294.
10. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111
(2013). cDNA is short for complementary DNA-complementary to messenger RNA, the
sequence of an intermediate molecule in protein product. Id.
11. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Myriad, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (No. 12-398), 2012 WL
4502947.
12. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2118-19.
13. See Dan L. Burk, The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REv. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2407094.
14. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEx.
L. REv. 1041, 1078-79 (2011) (discussing the difficulties in separating these terms).
15. See generally Christopher Beauchamp, Patenting Nature: A Problem of History,
16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 257, 300-06 (2013) (discussing the history of this exception).
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marily "informational" and those that are primarily "chemical" further complicates this distinction. And fourth, the ultimate extent to which technologies
constitute "well-understood, routine, conventional activity, previously engaged
in by researchers in the field" is potentially troublesome.16 Courts now face the
unenviable task of harmonizing Mayo and Myriad.
THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARD

Patent holders, in seeking judgments that their adversaries' activities infringe their patents, typically ask courts not merely to award damages but to enjoin infringers from particular business activities. Part and parcel of these requests are motions for preliminary injunctions -injunctions against the accused
activity during the pendency of the lawsuit. In assessing preliminary injunctions, courts have used the traditional four-part test: whether the plaintiff has
proved (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) an irreparable injury,
(3) that the balance of hardships falls in its favor, and (4) that the public interest
counsels in favor of a preliminary injunction.1 Because such requests come
early in the litigation process-indeed, often in tandem with the complaintcourts must resolve these factors prior to having had an opportunity to issue
substantive rulings with the aid of substantial discovery.
In the patent context, these factors are further given their own texture. The
first prong, likelihood of success on the merits, maps to the ultimate questions
of infringement and invalidity: whether the patent holder can prove infringement at trial, and whether the defendant can demonstrate that the patent is, for
whatever reason, invalid. The second prong usually focuses on whether the patent holder would suffer "price erosion"-an irreversible drop in prices-if
competitors enter the marketplace. 19 The third typically weighs the relative siz-

16. See Jacob S. Sherkow, And How: Mayo v. Prometheus and the Method of Invention, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 351, 351 (2013), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/
1144_obtqyfxe.pdf.
17. Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 16 (2012) (estimating the injunction rate in infringement suits
to be around seventy-five percent in district courts).
18. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
19. The texture of this prong may soon change. In Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc., Chief Justice John G. Roberts recently expressed the opinion that Teva was not
entitled to a stay of the Federal Circuit's mandate invalidating some of its patents. The Chief
Justice expressed skepticism that Teva would suffer "irreparable harm" if the mandate was
not stayed because "should Teva prevail in this Court and its patent be held valid, Teva will
be able to recover damages from respondents for past patent infringement," despite suffering
from price erosion. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 13A1003 (13-854), 2014
WL 1516642 (U.S. Apr. 18, 2014) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers). How well the "irreparable
harm" prong for stays of appellate mandates aligns with the "irreparable harm" prong of preliminary injunctions remains to be seen, but-as with Mayo and Myriad-the Court's words
here may further alter district courts' interpretations of the standard in patent disputes.
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es of the parties. And the fourth, at least historically, centered on the "strong
public interest in upholding a patentee's exclusive rights." 20
These factors-combined with a legal presumption of patent validitytypically tipped in favor of the patent holder, long making preliminary injunctions a "potent weapon in patent litigation."21 Famously, in Hybritech, Inc. v.
Abbott Laboratories,the district court granted a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of Abbott's antibody assays despite expressing doubt over every
one of the four prongs.22 At the time, however-over twenty years before the
Supreme Court's foray into patent eligibility -there was little doubt that Hybritech's inventions, or any inventions like them, were patentable subject matter. Times have changed.
ARIA AND AMBRY

Mayo and Myriad's lack of clarity, combined with their broad, sweeping
statements about the doctrine of patent eligibility, have added a particular wrinkle to requests for preliminary injunctions: despite patents' presumption of validity, courts appear to have become more emboldened to deny preliminary injunctions on the grounds that the asserted patents are likely to be invalid for
lack of patentable subject matter. That is, it seems that courts have begun to use
the vagaries of Mayo and Myriad as a way to deny-and subtly alter the standards for-preliminary injunctions. Two recent district court cases, Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc.23 and In re BRCAl- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test PatentLitigation (Ambry),24 demonstrate this development.
A. Aria
In Aria, the asserted patent claimed a method of detecting certain fetal genetic abnormalities, such as Down syndrome, using a simple, noninvasive
blood test of the pregnant mother.25 The heart of the invention focused on the
insight that some of the carrying mother's blood would likely contain some of

20. See In re BRCAl- and BRCA2-Based Hereditary Cancer Test Patent Litig. (Ambry), No. 2:14-MD-2510, 2014 WL 931057, at *56 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2014).
21. James J. Foster, The PreliminaryInjunction-A "New" and Potent Weapon in Patent Litigation, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 281, 281 (1986) (capitalization altered);
see M.A. Cunningham, PreliminaryInjunctive Relief in Patent Litigation, 35 IDEA 213, 231
(1995) (assessing the preliminary injunction grant rate in patent cases to be sixty-one percent
between October 1, 1982, and December 31, 1993).
22. No. CV 86-7461/AK (PX), 1987 WL 123997 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 1987), aff'd, 849
F.2d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
23. No. C 11-06391 SI, 2012 WL 2599340, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 2012), vacated,
726 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
24. 2014 WL 931057, at *1-2.
25. U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 col. 23 11. 61-68 (filed Mar. 4, 1998).
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the fetus's DNA, known as cell-free fetal DNA, or cffDNA.26 On Sequenom's
request for a preliminary injunction, the district court considered whether "the
discovery that fetal DNA is detectable in maternal [blood] . . . is an unpatenta-

ble natural phenomenon under Mayo." 27
Prior to Mayo, this analysis-at least in the context of requests for preliminary injunctions -would have strongly favored Sequenom, the patent holder.
Patents are entitled to a presumption of validity, which can only be undone by
"clear and convincing" evidence-a difficult burden prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Mayo.28 Furthermore, the burden of proof regarding invalidity rests on the accused infringer. 29
But Mayo's elusive language regarding which inventions constitute unpatentable "natural phenomena" through "well-understood, routine, conventional activity" provided Aria-and a skeptical district court-with at least a
"substantial question" as to the validity of Sequenom's patent. A method for
analyzing cffDNA, while clearly not an "abstract idea" under the Supreme
Court's pre-Mayo jurisprudence, now potentially fell within the realm of patent-ineligible "natural phenomena." And the procedures used to quantify
cffDNA-revolutionary from a market perspective 30-could, in some sense, be
considered no more than a creative application of "standard" (i.e., "wellunderstood, routine, conventional") techniques in molecular biology.31 These
arguments-almost certainly losers prior to Mayo-led the district court to ultimately deny Sequenom's request for a preliminary injunction because "Sequenom ha[d] not put forward substantial evidence that the steps described in
the specification [were] 'sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice
amount[ed] to significantly more than a patent upon the natural law itself."' 32
This concern with whether there exists "substantial evidence" to overcome
the practice of a "natural law," however, marks a subtle shift in preliminary injunction jurisprudence. Accurately assessing questions of patent eligibility requires more than rote legal conclusions. As the Federal Circuit recently declared, conclusions concerning patent eligibility are "rife with underlying
factual issues" 33 -complex, sophisticated factual issues difficult to determine
at nascent stages of litigation. Whether cffDNA constitutes a natural phenomenon under Mayo implicates scientific, technological, and even philosophical
inquiries poorly positioned for resolution on requests for preliminary injunc26. Aria, 2012 WL 2599340, at *2.
27. Id. at * 11 (citation omitted).
28. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
29. Id. at 2245.
30. See Aria, 2012 WL 2599340, at *3 (listing the potential market for cffDNA analysis as 750,000 patients).
31. See id. at * 12 ("However, the steps Sequenom used to enable their method claims
in light of the cell-free DNA discovery-namely fractionation (separating blood into cells
and plasma), amplification, and detection-are described as 'standard' in the patent itself.').
32. Id.
33. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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tions.34 And whether anything constitutes "well-understood, routine, conventional" techniques likely requires on-the-ground analysis of scientific practice,
better analyzed after substantial discovery. 35 By placing its focus on the first
preliminary injunction prong-likelihood of success on the merits-the district
court subtly moved the preliminary injunction standard from the preliminary to
the permanent, from a rudimentary calculus of harms to one fully engaged with
scientific fact.
B. Ambry
In Ambry, a suit brought by Myriad after the fallout from its earlier Supreme Court loss, the district court employed a similar analysis. Almost immediately after the Court's decision, several competitors, including Ambry Genetics, boldly announced that they were planning to directly compete with Myriad
by offering BRCA] and BRCA2 sequencing services to detect breast cancer
risk.36 Myriad subsequently brought suit against several companies on its remaining patent claims-including those expressly found to be patent eligible by
the Supreme Court-and asked the district court to enter a preliminary injunction against Ambry. 37
Although this factual and procedural posture makes it difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of Ambry in the absence of Myriad, two facets of the Myriad decision appeared to strongly support Myriad's request for a preliminary
injunction. First, the Supreme Court had specifically declared that Myriad's
cDNA claims were eligible for patent protection. Second, Myriad's remaining
claims were still afforded the same presumptions of validity given to any issued
claims: they could only be invalidated by a showing of "clear and convincing"
evidence. Neither facet strongly suggested that Ambry would have likely succeeded on the merits. Nonetheless, the district court fully engaged the parties
on the technological issues surrounding patent ineligibility, receiving thousands
of pages of scientific material, presiding over a two-day "technology tutorial,"
and crafting a 106-page opinion, the bulk of which detailed the parties' scientific arguments. 3 8
Ultimately, it was those scientific arguments that formed the backbone of
the court's denial of Myriad's request for a preliminary injunction. The Ambry
court declared that Myriad's synthetic DNA patents were likely invalid because, according to the Myriad decision itself, the claimed synthetic DNA se-

34. See Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L.
REv. 1137, 1139 (2014).
35. See Sherkow, supra note 16, at 356-57.
36. See Ambry, No. 2:14-MID-2510, 2014 WL 931057, at *1 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2014).
37. Id.
38. Id. at* 1-30.
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quences were not "distinct from the DNA from which it was derived"39-a
conclusion based in part on the court's own analysis of the genetic sequences at
issue.40 Further, the court declared that Myriad's claims directed to methods of
using its synthetic DNA were also likely invalid because, under Mayo, those
methods failed to contain an "inventive concept" according to the court's recitation of the state of the art in molecular biology as it existed twenty years prior
(when Myriad had filed for its patent). 41
Like the court's analysis in Aria, this nuanced, scholarly focus on how
Mayo and Myriad apply to truly difficult questions of molecular biology subtly
shifts the preliminary injunction analysis from the passing to the painstaking.
The court's thorough analysis of the complementarity of genetic sequences and
the history of molecular biology, and its valiant attempt to harmonize the Supreme Court's disparate patentable subject matter jurisprudence, belongs-if it
belongs anywhere-on papers for summary judgment, after the parties have
thoroughly engaged in discovery, narrowed the issues in dispute, and had time
to prepare expert rebuttal reports.
THE FuTuRE OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

Mayo and Myriad, as seen through Aria and Ambry, provide some insight
into the future of preliminary injunctions. In patent cases, it seems clear that
courts will increasingly engage in substantive issues of patent eligibility on requests for preliminary injunctions-and in doing so, increasingly deny them on
the grounds that the asserted patents are ineligible for protection. While judges
may feel that Mayo and Myriad give them broad leeway for such denials, the
opinions' cryptic language and legal nuances make preliminary injunctions a
poor forum for such deliberation. Patent holders, when requesting preliminary
injunctions, should now be prepared to make full-throated defenses of their inventions' eligibility.
Relatedly, Aria and Ambry also seem to show that district courts now appear more willing to imbue the latter three preliminary injunction factors with
their result in the first. In the Ambry case, for example, the district court's analysis of the public interest factor-historically pro-patentee-presumed the negative utility of Myriad's patents: they "hindered rather than promoted innovation," "distort[ed] rather than serve[d] the patent system[]," and utilized "a
commercial path that turns much of our patent system policy on its head." 42
This all but suggests that the court's thorough analysis as to whether Myriad
was likely to succeed on the merits simply became a mandate for the remaining
parcels of equity. While it is true that the first prong, likelihood of success on

39.
Ct. 2107,
40.
41.
42.

Id. at *44 (quoting Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
2119 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at *46.
Id. at *49-54.
Id. at *57.
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the merits, is the most important preliminary injunction factor, it is still but one
factor of four. The preliminary injunction standard should be an independent,
holistic balancing of each. Where the likelihood-of-success question is close or
exceedingly difficult-as it doubtless will be in many patent disputes after
Mayo and Myriad-that should counsel courts to pay more, and more serious,
attention to the remaining factors, not less.
More broadly, this subtle shift in preliminary injunctions paints an interesting picture of some of the unintended effects of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Mayo and Myriad were not decisions of clarity-nor were they meant to bebut they were necessary attempts to prune a thorny and wild area of patent law.
The opinions, if anything, counsel a careful deliberation of technology and law,
with an implicit understanding that such analyses were difficult. But these cautions have taken on a character of their own in the rapidly moving, partially
blind atmosphere of preliminary injunctions. This is all a greater lesson that an
appellate court's desire for care can be a trial court's command to haste.

